

END OF TOUR REPORT

Prepared
by

U. S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT DELIVERY TEAM
CAMBODIA

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#296

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1. GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABC	Report of MAP Material Deliveries to Cambodia
ADP	Automatic Data Processing
AGE	Aircraft Ground Support Equipment
AMEMB	American Embassy Phnom Penh
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASL	Authorized Stockage List
ASR	Ammunition Supply Rate
BII	Basic Issue Items
CBD	Combat Battle Damage
CCMSA	Coordinating Committee for Military Security Affairs
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific
CISO	Counter Insurgency Support Office
CONUS	Continental United States
COUNTRY TEAM	A counsel comprised of the Senior Representatives of all U.S. Agencies operating in a country
CSP	Concurrent Spare Parts
DAO	Defense Attache Office
DCM	Deputy Chief of Mission
DEPCJUSMAG	Deputy Chief, Joint United States Military Advisory Group
DGI	Director General of Instruction
DPSC	Defense Procurement Supply Center
DS	Direct Support
FANK	Forces Armees Nationales Khmeres
FAO	Foreign Assistance Office
GOA	Government of Australia
GKR	Government of the Khmer Republic

GVN	Government of Vietnam
ILC	International Logistics Center
IRAN	Inspect and Repair as Necessary
ITG	Individual Training Group (U.S.)
JTD	Joint Table of Distribution
KA	Khmer Army
KAF	Khmer Air Force
LMAT	Logistics Management Assistance Team
LOC	Line of Communications
LS&E	Long Supply and Excess
LST	Landing Ship Tank
MACV	Military Assistance Command Vietnam
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MAPEX	Military Assistance Program Excess
MASL	Military Articles and Sales List
MAT	Maintenance Assistance Team
MEDMAN	Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia Military Assistance Manual
MEDTC	Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia
MHE	Mechanical Handling Equipment
MILSTRIP	Military Standard Requisition and Issue Procedure
MIMEX	Major Item Excess
MNK	Marine National Khmer (Khmer Navy)
MOBASE	Navy Mobile Support Base
MPA	Military Pay and Allowances
MSC	Military Sealift Command

MSR	Main Supply Route
MTT	Mobile Training Team
NAVILCO	Navy International Logistics Command
OICC	Officer-in-Charge of Construction
OJT	On the Job Training
OR&L	Operational Requirements and Liaison Branch
PAMEX	Pacific Area Excesses
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
PI	Phase Inspections
PLL	Prescribed Load List
PMS	Preventative Maintenance System
POL	Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants
PURA	Pacific Command Utilization and Redistribution Agency
PUSH	Automatic Supply without Requisitions
RDD	Required Delivery Date
RSR	Required Supply Rate (Ammunition)
RTAF	Royal Thailand Air Force
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
SAS	Shared Administrative Support
SIMEX	Secondary Item Excess
SO	Stockage Objective
SRMA	Special Representative for Military Assistance
SSG	Special Support Group
TA 50	Individual Equipment (Examples: Webbing, Helmets, etc.)

TBY	Temporary Duty
THAIAM	Air America Maintenance Facility in Thailand
TOE	Tables of Organization and Equipment
TOR	Terms of Reference
TRIPARTITE	MACV, ARVN, JGS and FANK Staff Monthly Staff Meetings
USG	United States Government
USAMC	United States Army Material Command
USARV	United States Army Vietnam
VNAF	Vietnam Air Force
VNN	Vietnam Navy

II. FORMAT

1. MEDTC was organized on a "crash basis" with practically no institutional memory except for rudimentary working files inherited from its predecessors in the Military Aid Program for Cambodia; the Pol Mil Counselor's Staff in Phnom Penh and the provisional Special Support Group of the MACV Staff in Saigon. As a result of CIMEDTC's plea to CINCPAC for historical data on the previous Cambodian MAAG, Brigadier General Taber's final report on the termination in 1963 of Cambodia's first U.S. Military Aid Program was forwarded to Saigon. Although nearly seven years had passed, many of the conditions reported by General Taber still existed and the recommendations were still valid. Influenced by the usefulness of this "historical report", this end of tour report has been designed with a similar objective in mind. It hopefully will provide the needed background data and institutional memory so that when a specific subject arises, one can trace not only what was done, or not done, but why.

2.

a. With this objective in mind, the format is organized in four parts, an introduction and three sections. The introduction provides an overview and summary of the entire report along with a precis of the most significant accomplishments and recommendations. The introduction can be read by itself by those who wish only a quick summary of operations of the first year of the MEDTC. The three sections which follow provide extensive background data and more detailed discussions of areas highlighted in the introduction. These sections were designed to be useful to the Cambodian "desk officers" at higher headquarters as succinct reference data on the subjects discussed.

b. Topics in each of these three sections are separated in two groups; those areas where significant progress has been made and those areas where problems exist and continuing efforts are required to correct them. Since few topics fall clearly in only one area, there naturally is some overlap. Topics have been placed in the section of prime interest based on a judgment of the progress to date.

III. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

After the removal of Prince Sihanouk on 18 March 1970, the Lon Nol Government of the Khmer Republic requested U.S. assistance. In response to this request, President Nixon re-instituted a Military Assistance Program for Cambodia effective 22 April 1970 as a Presidential determination utilizing funds from the worldwide 1970 MAP.

During the remaining two months of FY 70, \$8.9 million in Military Assistance was provided to Cambodia. In FY 71 Congress authorized a Military Assistance Program for Cambodia of \$185 million. From 22 April to 14 June 1970, the Military Assistance Program was administered in-country by the Defense Attache, supported from MACV by a Special Support Group (SSG) formed by MACV J4. On 14 June 1970, Mr. Jonathan F. Ladd, who was appointed Political/Military Counselor (PMC) and CINCPAC Special Representative for Military and Security Assistance Matters (SRMA), assumed responsibility for the in-country execution of the Military Assistance Program with continued support by the MACV SSG. The PM operational staff in-country was gradually augmented to 16 authorized personnel, of whom six officers and four enlisted men were actually present for duty in Phnom Penh on 31 December 1970. Requirements for assistance were established by the SRMA. Weapons, ammunition and other supplies were furnished by COMUSMACV through the Special Support Group.

During mid-May 1970 a Special Support Group (SSG) was established in MACV J4 to coordinate material deliveries to Cambodia. Elements of the MACV Training Directorate and Military Assistance Office initiated plans to train and equip the Forces Armees Nationales Khmère (FANK). Various staff sections of MACV provided individuals and groups to study the Cambodian situation, survey requirements and participate in the development of plans to assist the Khmer Republic to mobilize, equip and train its armed forces. During June and August 1970, two CINCPAC conferences were held to establish an organized and coordinated approach to the program. During this period quantities of captured enemy equipment and older U.S. weapons (i.e., M-1 Carbines, M-1 Garand Rifles, etc.) were furnished to Cambodia. The two Khmer Khrom Mobile Strike Forces and the La Bang Sick Chock Brigade were re-equipped and dispatched to Phnom Penh to bolster the outnumbered and demoralized FANK. Support for FANK ranged from aerial supply shipments to close support air strikes and cross border operations. At the same time the \$185 million dollar FY 71 program was introduced into the CINCPAC and DOD MAP data bases. Because of rapidly changing

requirements and the relatively late development of the program (in context of the normal MAP planning, programming, budgeting cycle), the program included many undefined lines. All items were provided on a call forward basis in response to requirements established by the SRMA. Concurrently, MACV in coordination with RVN, established the battalion and company training programs and specialist training in RVN.

B. FORMATION OF MEDTC

During the late calendar year 1970 it became increasingly evident that a single point of contact was required to administer the support to Cambodia. During December 1970 a special study group was formed in MACV to plan for the establishment of the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia (MEDTC). MEDTC was activated on 31 January 1971. Initially MEDTC was staffed from MACV assets, specifically officers from the SSG and MACV staff who had administered the Cambodian assistance and the 10 military personnel who had formed a part of the operational staff of the SRMA. The original authorization for MEDTC provided for 16 personnel to be stationed in Cambodia and 44 in Saigon. They provided some continuity for the newly organized MEDTC. MEDTC was also strongly influenced by the final report submitted by BG Taber when Military Assistance to Cambodia was terminated late in 1965. Although nearly seven years had elapsed since his report, most of the conditions reported then still existed and the recommendations were still valid. With the "low profile" syndrome inhibiting effective staffing the report furnished an excellent resume of where problems had developed before and where we could expect difficulties during our current program.

The organization of MEDTC was unique. It was designed to execute the Cambodian Military Assistance Program within the guideline of the Nixon Doctrine, the constraints of the Cooper Church Amendment and in consonance with the overall U.S. objectives and strategy for Southeast Asia. The keystones of the Nixon Doctrine are partnership, strength and the willingness to negotiate. The U.S. policy is to continue to play a role in Asia to the extent that Asian nations bilaterally and collectively desire us to play a role while reducing our involvement and presence in other nations affairs. Assistance will be provided in the form of equipment and advice without becoming heavily involved with our own personnel. Although the U.S. will provide equipment and supplies, the Asian nation must assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense. (The Cooper Church Amendment restricted the "providing advice" aspect of the Nixon Doctrine by requiring that no U.S. military personnel in the Khmer Republic will act in an advisory or training capacity nor participate in ground combat operations.)

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Finally the U.S. support for Cambodia is tailored to the primary U.S. objectives of sustaining Cambodian neutrality and facilitating Vietnamization.

The MEDTC Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) and Terms of Reference were prepared within these guidelines, submitted through CINCPAC, and approved by Department of Defense (DOD) in March 1971. MEDTC was initially organized with a rear echelon in RVN and a forward echelon in Cambodia. The JTD was drastically tailored to maintain a low profile of U.S. military in Cambodia. Interim staffing was approved for 60, mostly stationed in RVN. To keep the overall strength of MEDTC low, it was designed to function as the manager and point of contact for all U.S. military assistance activities while calling on other U.S. agencies for administrative and logistics support. In fact, MEDTC as structured cannot function by itself. The ten military stationed in Phnom Penh and working under the supervision of the SRMA became MEDTC-Forward and a full Colonel was designated as Deputy Chief Forward. With the approval of the JTD the Cambodia contingent was increased to 23 and MEDTC was authorized a total of 113 personnel. However, 31 of the JTD spaces were not filled because their functions required a presence in Cambodia and the personnel ceiling in Cambodia continued at 23.

As the tempo of material shipments increased, the contingent in Cambodia could not keep abreast of determining requirements to support FANK's mobilization much less execute even minimally the statutory requirements in monitoring and executing a Military Assistance Program. The Department of Defense pressed for approval to station the entire team in Phnom Penh except for a small element to coordinate support from MACV. After numerous exchanges between DOD and SECSTATE a compromise position developed in which SECSTATE agreed to permit 50 MEDTC members to enter Cambodia provided the majority were fluent in French. The Departments responded rapidly to assign French language specialists to MEDTC and by September the forward MEDTC element approached a strength of 50.

This authorization was increased to 62 in December 1971, however, the increased authorization has not been implemented pending a complete review of the MEDTC JTD by a CINCPAC Manpower Management Study Team.

C. SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS

The primary accomplishment has been the successful application of the Nixon Doctrine to achieve U.S. goals and objectives in Cambodia. With a minimal use of U.S. manpower, the Khmer Armed Forces have been trained and equipped sufficiently for the Khmer Republic to maintain its independence and neutrality. Elements of four VC/NVA divisions have been diverted from South Vietnam to protect Communist base camps and lines of communications. VC/NVA manpower, ammunition and material have also been diverted to and expended in Cambodia with a corresponding degradation of their capability to attack and harass the GVN. These actions have all facilitated Vietnamization.

Working primarily through the Tripartite Deputies Group, regional cooperation has been fostered between the GVN and GKR. Outgrowths of the Tripartite Deputies Meetings have been a series of cooperative efforts between FANK and RVNAF to include combined operations joining RVNAF and FANK ground forces; RVNAF direct support of FANK with tactical air support, helicopter troop lifts, aerial resupply and artillery fire support; and both individual and unit training provided for FANK by RVNAF.

Throughout the year, the lines of communication have been maintained open to a degree that no real crisis has developed in either the supply of military hardware and supplies or the flow of goods for the civilian sector. The Mekong LOC has been operated without interruption and land convoys have successfully operated along routes 1, 4 and 5 with only intermittent, infrequent and minor delays.

The training and equipping of combat units in RVN has continued at a rapid pace. Most of the MAP trained battalions have performed well in combat and these units have become the backbone of the FANK combat capability. The training and equipping of other combat support and combat service support units has progressed well but these units do not have the visibility associated with the training program in RVN. Examples are the training of FANK artillery units by FANK MITS which had been trained in RVN. Progress is also evident in the FANK School system and FANK training centers. Albeit embryonic in nature, FANK is making a sincere effort to develop an in-country training base and both company size unit and individual training are in progress.

Notable success has been attained in coordinating the activities of all parties concerned in the execution of the Cambodian MAP program. Keep in mind that many actions

involve three countries; the US, the GKR and either the GVN or the RVN and as usual many US agencies. To closely coordinate all US agency actions, the country team meets weekly in formal session to discuss military security affairs. Likewise weekly and at times daily coordination meetings are held with high level FANK officials to coordinate the execution of the Military Assistance Program.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. MAP Procedures

A major constraint in the execution of the Military Assistance Program for Cambodia is the relative inflexibility of MAP procedures under wartime conditions. Changes in the tactical situation and intensity of combat with resulting changes in requirements, often urgent, cannot be rapidly executed by the normal MAP procedures. Although CINCPAC and DOD have made prodigious efforts to process changing Cambodian requirements, emergency approval and dissemination of funding authority routinely exceeds six weeks before supply action can be initiated. Then long leadtimes and pipeline shipping times incur further delays.

Some provisions should be made in MAP procedures to designate MAP countries at war and institute special procedures for their support. These procedures should include limited authority to:

- a. Requisition items not listed in the MASL
- b. Requisition items not programmed and approved by DOD before the fact and,
- c. Purchase items through off shore sources.

This limited authority should be delegated so that a rapid response can be made to urgent military requirements and to minor requirements when a speedy response will have a psychological or morale impact.

2. French Language Requirement

The requirement for personnel assigned to MEDTC FMD to be qualified in French should be deemphasized. Although the French language is important to US officers in Cambodia, the technical competence and professionalism of assigned personnel continue to be paramount. In the past, individuals have been assigned to MEDTC who were expertly

fluent in French but did not have the requisite experience in technical matters. It is important to have individuals assigned who can act as interpreters both in French and Khmer; the remainder of the personnel require only limited French and technical competence of assigned people should be of primary concern.

5. Combined Planning

Within the context of the Nixon Doctrine and considering the constraints of an extremely small US contingent, planning documents specially the MAP plan should be releaseable to the host country. This release must be sanitized and certainly must include caveats that the final plan will be dependent on congressional action. For the host country to execute their portion of the plan effectively, the plan in toto must be a combined product to include considerations of force structure, deferral priorities and material requirements.

II. SECTION I - MEDTC INTERNAL OPERATIONS

A. AREAS OF PROGRESS

1. Staff Coordination

Since its inception on 31 January 1971, MEDTC has been in a constant state of change. From an embryonic staff, MEDTC has grown to approximately 100 personnel basically divided between Phnom Penh and Saigon RVN. Excellent progress has been made in establishing internal operating procedures to insure the performance of the many varied functions required in executing a Military Assistance Program. However, the inherent disadvantage of operating a split headquarters mitigates against the smooth managerial functioning that professional military officers accept as normal. Initially, internal controls were established by a series of office memoranda and later expanded procedures for internal operations were published such as the policy and procedures guide and the Supplement to the Military Assistance Manual (MEDMAN).

To minimize the difficulties associated with operating from two locations, release of messages and documents is centralized in two individuals - the Deputy Chief in Saigon and the Assistant Chief in MEDTC (FWD) depending on the location of CMEDTC. Minutes from all staff meetings are distributed to both locations with action assigned by division or branch and location. Minutes of CCMSA meetings and PAXX liaison meetings are likewise circulated to both staffs. Outgoing messages are transmitted as a matter of routine for the information of the alternate location. All agencies dealing with MEDTC have been asked to route all communications to both MEDTC in Saigon and MEDTC (FWD) in Phnom Penh. In addition key members of MEDTC and action officers travel back and forth frequently between Phnom Penh and Saigon to effect coordination. CMEDTC returns to the headquarters in Saigon two or more days each week to coordinate the activities of the headquarters with the forward element located in Phnom Penh. By doing this personally, some of the duplicity of effort is eliminated. After each trip a memorandum for record is made and the appropriate division is tasked with the responsibility of carrying generated projects out. These meetings afford an opportune time for policy decisions or clarifications. The Chief of Plans and Programs travels weekly to Phnom Penh to attend the CCMSA meetings, and action officers routinely congregate at either Saigon or Phnom Penh to coordinate and study special and recurring actions. Three officers in the OR&L Division are permanently stationed in Saigon to coordinate with MACV, RVNAF and other agencies in Saigon.

The message-releasing operation for the Forward element, by virtue of the fact MEDTC is collocated with the embassy, has been tempered by different operating procedures than are normally associated with a military organization. In order to reduce the number of personnel in country, the communication team, which would have supplied all the communications for the forward element was deleted by agreement with the Ambassador. Normal releasing of messages brings into bearing the Country Team concept allowing coordination between all organizations involved thereby reducing duplicity of effort or misunderstanding of policies and actions. MEDTC has authority to release all messages which do not impact on the Country Team operations. On a daily basis a message reading file is prepared containing all MEDTC action and info messages, Embassy messages for CHMEDTC's information, and all MEDTC outgoing messages. By reviewing these daily and making annotations on the messages, ideas and desires can be disseminated to all sections without having to contact the individual concerned, thereby saving time.

Within the OR&L Division, MAPEL folders are maintained on all MAP supported units. Records of training, equipment, inspections, commanders' names, TOE, and any other pertinent information as necessary are maintained in each of these folders. Liaison officers who inspect units use these folders as reference prior to inspections. Information available in the MAPEL folders forms the basis for required monthly reports and is an extensive information file which allows MEDTC to follow the progress of MAP supported units.

Notwithstanding the progress in coordinating operations between MEDTC in Saigon and MEDTC-FWD in Phnom Penh, the two locations split operation continues to hamper operations severely. With the Plans and Programs Division and Logistics Division located in Saigon, important elements of up-to-date information and responsive execution of directives and decisions are not always readily available to CHMEDTC. Time delays are incurred in the decision making process. Communications are delayed at times through technical difficulties. Classification of subjects requires a secure voice line or preparation of messages with inherent delays. Staffing of positions and responses are delayed either by the delivery of documents or the dispatch of messages back and forth between the two locations. Travel and direct coordination back and forth is restricted by lack of readily available air transport. When available, command aircraft are employed. At other times transportation is available only on thrice weekly KAF C-47 flights or by traveling on intermittent air cargo flights originating from Bien Hoa or other locations. The coordination problems resulting from communications deficiencies, time

delays, transportation inadequacies and the restricted exchange of timely data further leads to duplication of efforts at both sites, complicates the delineation of responsibility, hampers the timely preparation of responses, and at times interjects confusion in the execution of the mission.

2. Planning and Programming

Significant progress has been made in planning and programming procedures. Due to the urgency of providing immediate support and the compressed time frame, the Cambodian Military Assistance Program started one full year behind the normal program budget cycle. During the period from January to June 1971, the threat was analyzed, a force structure plan was developed and coordinated with FANK, Tables of Organization and Equipment were published for most units and the data was transcribed into a FY 72 program. The initial FY 72 plan and program were submitted to CINCPAC in May 1971. After intensive review of the FY 72 program, a conference at CINCPAC early in August revised the FY 72 plan and an updated FY 72 program was introduced in the MAP data base in September 1971. By November 1971 a plan and program were submitted for the outyears FY 73 - 77 and the planning programming cycle approached the normal time frames. With the submission of the FY 73 plan in June 1972 the planning programming-budgeting cycle will conform with normal MAP procedures.

3. MEDTC Staffing

The MEDTC was activated on 30 January 1971 with an initial personnel authorization of 60. Sixteen of the authorized 60 positions were authorized for the forward element in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, and the remaining 44 positions were authorized for Saigon, the location of the rear echelon and headquarters. The original JTD was approved on 2 March 1971 and on 8 May 1971 authorization was granted to increase the forward element to 23 personnel and on 8 July 1971 the authorization forward was increased to 50. A further increase to 62 was approved 21 December 1971. The Ambassador approved an increase of 12 personnel to consist of one individual to monitor counterpart funds, three to receive shipments at Kompong Som, four to monitor the Third Country national contract in Cambodia, three to monitor the FANK in-country training program and one to monitor the FANK personnel management system. There are currently 48 individuals performing duties in Phnom Penh.

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The Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia is currently authorized 113 persons to perform its mission. As of 31 December 1971 there were 102 personnel assigned. In addition, there were 9 individuals on TDY performing required duties pending arrival of individuals on PCS. Due to long lead time in requisitioning personnel, TDY personnel have been required pending arrival of permanently assigned persons. This has occurred primarily in the Log Division, when new personnel were authorized to perform duties in positions that were created as a result of changes to the TD. The TDY personnel, although partially knowledgeable in their specific NOS, generally were not of the authorized grade nor experience level required, and could not be fully utilized until they became familiar with MAP procedures. Although TDY help is somewhat less than satisfactory, these individuals were a definite asset to the team.

Authorization for additional personnel forward will require a corresponding increase in the JTD. Due to the limited number of individuals authorized the team, and the many diverse activities required, it is not possible to absorb the increase forward from the personnel authorized in Saigon.

4. Force Structure

The development of the MAP supported force structure included political, military and economic considerations. The US plan was developed based on an analysis of the VC/NVA threat and the forces deemed minimal to contain the threat in a manner consistent with the US objectives of sustaining Cambodian independence and neutrality while aiding Vietnamization by disrupting VC/NVA base support areas. The FANK plan was ambitious and envisioned much larger and more sophisticated armed forces capable of defeating and ejecting the enemy from all Cambodian territory. In ensuing negotiations, and in part limited by the economic impact on Cambodia of supporting large armed forces, a compromise force level of 220,000 was agreed upon by the Ambassador and Sirik Matak.

Using the agreed force level, Tables of Organization and Equipment were prepared jointly with FANK. The TOE's were based on an extensive MACV study which considered various factors such as the enemy threat, FANK capabilities for mobilization etc. The ARVN force structure was used as a guideline, but was reduced in size and complexity consistent with the limited funding guidance and US objectives. From the initial efforts, the programmed support for Khmer forces has been austere. The plan has focused on providing

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only light infantry equipment, light artillery, unsophisticated aircraft, minimal heavy equipment and no tanks. The austere and unsophisticated nature of MAP support has been in keeping with our estimates of the Cambodian capacity to absorb and effectively use the equipment provided.

The equipping and training of units has made good progress. The activation of Mobile Operations Battalions, Separate Companies, Special Forces units and numerous other units are virtually on schedule. Delays in receipt of funding have forced some revisions of plans to equip units. Certain types of equipment are just not available without waiting normal procurement leadtimes.

Numerous constraints have inhibited the rapid attainment of the force structure goal. FANK internal management problems and the lack of a viable personnel system have restricted their capability to form and train units. Austere and uncertain availability of funds have delayed the purchase and receipt of equipment and supplies on a timely basis. Actual funding ceilings have prohibited MAP support of the desired 220,000 man force level. Available funds are not sufficient to sustain both current operations and the desired force expansion. The actual MAP supported force will approach 176,000 in FY 72. National priorities and other PACOM claimants have restricted the availability of supplies to MAP Cambodia. Internally, unprogrammed requirements have developed due to changes in the tactical situation and combat losses which have required diversions of funds and assets from their intended use.

5. LOG Activities

a. Transshipment thru Vietnam

Upon activation of the MEDTC, the storage of MAP Cambodia general cargo was being performed by USARV at USAD Long Binh. Ammunition was also stored in USARV facilities at Long Binh and Cam Ranh Bay. MEDTC operated a small warehouse at Tan Son Nhut Air Base which was used to stage cargo for air shipment.

On 27 April 1971, USARV notified MEDTC that as of 1 September 1971, the Army could no longer support the storage and local haul of MAP Cambodia supplies nor the deprocessing of MAP vehicles received in Vietnam. MEDTC recommended and CINCPAC concurred in obtaining contractual services to assume these functions.

Winnell Corporation was awarded the contract and since 1 September 1971 has operated the 29,000 square foot Long Binh warehouse, the 4000 square foot Tan Son Nhut warehouse provided local haul services using 3 S&P trailers and two 5 ton flatbeds, deprocessed MAP vehicles received in Vietnam, and provided a port representative at Newport Army Terminal. The Long Binh Depot still provides approximately 10,000 square feet of refrigerated storage space.

The assumption of these functions by a civilian contractor has given MEDTC closer control of the MAP cargo being received in Vietnam and destined for Cambodia.

When the contract was initiated, all Army cargo was taken to Long Binh and received into stock. All Navy and Air Force cargo by-passed the warehouse and was sent directly in-country. Permission was obtained from the Inventory Control Center to use various unit identifier codes to indicate various depots in Cambodia. This Army cargo can now by-pass the warehouse and go directly in-country. This is considered a major improvement in our throughput system. It enables the warehouse personnel to concentrate on storing items that should be stored instead of throughput. The magnitude involved is indicated in the growth of line items stored from 329 lines to 890 lines over a two month period.

The monthly slow movers report provides each commodity manager with a picture of what is not moving. This report lists all items that have not been issued in the past 30 days, 60 days, and 90 days. This serves to remind the commodity managers that the warehouse is a temporary storage facility. It also provides them with a cross check on stock record quantities held by the warehouse versus their own stock record balances.

b. Use of Excess

The Long Supply and Excess Section has made substantial strides in using established excess programs to provide material for MAP Cambodia. The major excess programs used have been MIMEX, MAPEX, and PAMEX/SIMEX. Through use of MIMEX, a program in which major items are obtained from world wide sources, MEDTC has received over \$17 million in property for MAP Cambodia. Included in this are over \$5 million in various aircraft, \$6 million in weapons and \$4 million in ammunition. Through the use of MAPEX, a program in which excess property can be made available from Southeast Asia agencies, MEDTC has acquired over \$5 million in property for MAP Cambodia. Included in this figure has been over \$3 million in individual equipment. To facilitate this program, teams consisting of one U.S. Army and five FANK

personnel are located at each of four Property Disposal Offices in South Vietnam. Each team is tasked with the responsibility of screening all property which comes into the PDO facility. Upon deciding on which property can be used, the team informs the LS&E Officer, who then requests a release on the property from CINCPAC. This program is a continuing program which should become more valuable to MEDTC as a greater amount of equipment is turned into PDO activities. Through the use of PANEX, a program which enables MAP countries to use the PACOM Utilization and Redistribution Agency (PURA), MEDTC is now eligible for distribution of many classes of excess property which are reported to PURA by DOD agencies within the Pacific Command. While recognizing the tremendous advantages of PURA, MEDTC is confronted with a considerable different operating environment than MAAG's dealing with a long established and stable peacetime host country logistical base. It is first necessary to establish stock records and demand data of needed assets before full participation can be accomplished. MEDTC Logistics Division, Saigon, is in the process of developing these stock records. Stock records for the Khmer Air Force are complete and action is being taken to input the necessary data to PURA. Stock record cards are also established for the Marine Nationale Khmer (MNK), but minimum/maximum levels for these assets have not yet been established. Maximum levels should be established before a submission to PURA is made. MEDTC Logistics Division, Forward, is in the process of developing Navy minimum/maximum levels. Stock record cards are in the process of being established for the FANK Army. This is being accomplished at MEDTC Logistics Division, Saigon, by use of Component Spare Parts (CSP) listings. These listings will be used to establish minimum/maximum levels. Some progress has been made in this area with the submission of over seventy-five line items to PURA. MEDTC Logistics Division, Saigon (Army), is awaiting additional CSP's before establishing more stock records.

c. Transportation of Cargo

A viable transportation program for the movement of MAP cargo from its transshipment point (RVN) to Phnom Penh, Cambodia has been established via these modes:

Water (River): This has been and continues to be the primary method of supply. The Mekong River Convoy was established as the water LOC in February 1971. It was initially comprised of VNN LST's but rapidly converted to barges provided by contract with the Alaska Barge and Transport Company with security provided by VNN and MNK river patrol craft. Bulk POL has also been shipped on charter tankers via these convoys.

During the period February 1971 to 13 January 1972 a total of 67 barges have delivered at Phnom Penh. Cargos have consisted principally of munitions, barrier materials, bridging components and rolling stock. The number of convoys per month reached a peak of 4 each in April and July 1971 and maintained a mean of 3 each per month. As of 15 January 1972 there will be an average of 2 each convoys per month during CY 1972.

Water (Deep Draft): A system test of the feasibility of using Kompong Som, Cambodia as an alternate port of entry for MAP cargo was favorably conducted on 1 January 1972. The vessel "Transglobe", a U.S. time charter vessel, called at Kompong Som and discharged an initial increment of 25 each, M35A2 vehicles. Due to the success of this system test, a second, larger incremental delivery (79 each, M35A2) was scheduled and arrived 2 February 1972, aboard the same vessel. This increment also off loaded without incident.

Air (VNAF, USAF): This has been and continues to be the major secondary mode for MAP cargo delivery. In the initial stages it was primarily conducted utilizing VNAF C-119 and C-123 aircraft with U.S. C-130 aircraft as backup. VNAF discontinued their service effective 31 October 1971 and the entire aerial support mission (less airdrop) was assumed by USAF C-130 aircraft. During the period February 1971 to 31 October 1971, VNAF flew a total of 801 sorties. USAF aircraft (C-130) during the February 1971 to 13 January 1972 period flew a total of 559 sorties with 78 of those missions coming after the cessation of VNAF support. For comparison; during the month of October 1971, VNAF flew 88 sorties and USAF 19, in November, USAF aircraft as sole support flew 56 missions.

Air (Air Drop): During the period February 1971 to January 1972, the USAF has flown 7 emergency aerial resupply missions in support of FANK field units engaged in combat. This system is utilized only after FANK has exhausted all other means of re-supply to include VNAF, which has primary Vietnamization responsibility for providing this support. The number of VNAF re-supply missions is unknown. With the withdrawal of U.S. riggers USAF will not accept cargo rigged by RVN or FANK unless checked by U.S. riggers. This will require MEDTC to reprogram its personnel assets to include certain personnel with parachute rigger experience.

Air (MAC): MEDTC used MAC Special Mission Airlift (SMAR) direct from CONUS to Phnom Penh, Cambodia for the first time in early January 1972. A total of seven missions were flown with a combined cargo of 36 105MM Howitzers, model M102.

Highway (Motor Convoy): The highway mode has been used to support MAP Cambodia requirements. MAP purchased a total of 600, 7 ton, commercial trucks (International Harvester and Dodge) with 100 trailers from the Government of Australia (GOA). These vehicles were conveyed by highway from Vung Tau, RVN to Phnom Penh, Cambodia. The first convoy was conducted in April 1971, and the fifth and final increment in September 1971. All convoys were successfully completed without major incident. The cargo was conex containers with TA 50 equipment and organic spare parts.

Management (Port Operations): FANK has improved steadily in the areas of vessel and aircraft discharge and port clearance. Planes remain on the ground the minimum time necessary to accomplish discharge and FANK now has gained experience in discharge with aircraft as large as USAF C-141. Air cargo does not remain in the aerial port overnight under any circumstances. FANK water discharge operations at Phnom Penh are capable of turning around 2 barges in a 24 hour period and port clearance is rapid and efficient.

Highway convoy operations are successfully carried out utilizing MAP provided U.S. vehicles and the MAP purchased GOA commercial vehicles. Major main supply routes (MSR) in use by FANK on a regular basis are Route 4 (Kompong Som to Phnom Penh) and Route 5 (Battambang to Phnom Penh). However, the increased use of Route 4 as a MAP LOC will undoubtedly turn the attention of the enemy to Route 4 which can be easily blocked, other highways are used as the tactical situation dictates or permits.

Continuing projects basically are designed to improve and expand LOC's by encouraging maximum use of all airfields, highways, and waterways in Cambodia. An improving route security on major Cambodian highways will encourage increased use of vehicle convoys.

Utilization of survey approved airfields for receipt of MAP cargo supplied by air is anticipated. The success of the initial system test of Kompong Som as an alternate port of entry will be vigorously pursued to facilitate faster water resupply of end items coming direct from offshore suppliers and CONUS. This will provide relief from the necessity to transship all major items by barge from Saigon, RVN to Phnom Penh via Mekong River convoy. This of course depends upon an improved security situation which will allow FANK to insure the security of both Kompong Som and Route 4 which they cannot do now.

Increased consideration of the use of MAC, Special Mission Aircraft to move high priority and items direct from CONUS to Phnom Penh will be studied, placing emphasis on sensitive, highly pilferable items and emergency demand items. The experience gained by all concerned during the 105MM Howitzer movement of January 1972 demonstrated how successful this procedure could be.

Every effort will be made to urge the FANK to effectively manage their transportation assets and their traffic flow to insure efficient, economic utilization of their growing transportation capabilities. A key program in this area is to encourage the use of Otters instead of choppers for staff field visits and resupply.

Finally MEDTC will strive to utilize all common user lift assets within the U.S. Military Transportation System to ensure MAP Cambodia requirements are met in a timely manner.

d. Supply Operations

Actual delivery of equipment by MEDTC has operated between two counteracting pressures. While FANK has increased in size many fold, U.S. Forces who have operated the MEDTC logistical system have been reduced due to the draw down. The requirement to operate as a transshipment point delivering some equipment to training sites in Vietnam and Thailand and the balance to Phnom Penh, make the effects of draw down more severe than an overview would reveal, with pilferage and less efficiency among non-U.S. personnel only two of many add-on problems.

Another restriction on the logistics system has been the uncertainty of funding action by Congress. As funds have become available, many unrealistic "required delivery dates" (RDD) have had to be imposed on suppliers. Those requisitions that had reasonable times for response were still priority 02 requiring maximum use of air shipment, and the lowest priority generally has been 05 (fastest available surface mode).

Internally, TDY personnel have been used to fill commodity manager spaces for two commodity groups (Quartermaster/Medical/POL and Ordnance). This has resulted in 6 different "managers" for one commodity in the last 5 months. The impact, as might be expected, has been the loss of continuity of action and records needed to maintain effective supply response.

None the less material is flowing at a considerable rate. For Army material, the rate is controlled by a pull system to call forward material, with call forward keyed to equipment required delivery dates for different units. The pull system avoids complete inundation of our limited storage and handling capacity, and permits a reasonably orderly scheduled of on ward shipments to Phnom Penh.

A push system is more desirable and selected items (for example all concurrent spare parts) are placed on push as soon as feasible.

Where possible (for example with radio batteries and TA-50 clothing and equipment) forecasts are made to supply channels which provide a basis for future planning in International Logistics Channels.

e. Ammunition and Weapons

During CY 71 a modified PUSH ammunition supply system was used for Army and Air Force munitions drawn from USARV and 7th AF respectively in RVN, and Navy peculiar ammunition supplied from CONUS. The modified PUSH system is based on a weekly report compiled by FANK and submitted after review and correction by MEDTC FWD. Shipments are projected three weeks into the future to maintain a 30 day stockage objective (SO) in the Cambodian supply system (less basic loads).

First Quarter CY 71 was concerned mostly with development of a solid supply base within RVN and provisions of adequate transportation. USARV and 7th Air Force stockage was attained by forecasting the number of rounds by type required per month, 90 days in advance of need. Due to the fact that MEDTC was not able to project ammunition requirements accurately in advance for a rapidly increasing requirement, supplies were seldom available in quantities and types needed. This situation improved and by the end of the quarter had been resolved. Special effort was required to provide FANK with a 30 day supply of ammunition prior to the first ARVN incursion into Laos. MEDTC used 6 U.S. C-130 sorties per day, and one VNN LST to build-up supplies before transportation assets were shifted to support the ARVN incursion. In addition, Alaska Barge and Transportation barges, under operational control of MSC, were pressed into service. In the end, transportation assets outstripped ammunition availability from USARV and the full 30 days was not built up. However, at that time, only ammunition assets at Kambol Depot were being reported, and the FANK supply situation was not as grave as first thought.

During Second Quarter CY 71 progress continued toward attainment of 60 days SO in USARV and a 30 day SO in Cambodia and realistic requirements for ammunition were developed. Initially the weapons density supported was all weapons reported on hand by FANK if they could fire U.S. manufactured ammunition (for example Chinese 82MM mortars using 81MM U.S. ammo). Based on this system and using ARVN firing rates, except where there was some firm indication of a FANK rate, the FY 72 requirement was computed. The total cost projected was 187 million dollars against a ceiling of 200 million dollars. The decision at that time was to place 60 percent of the dollar requirement into short fall to bring the program under ceiling. Another important project during this period was a study of the French "Unit of Fire" system of basic load computation used by FANK. When related to days of supply, based on ARVN firing rates, a unit of fire varied from 40 days for small arms to 160 days for large caliber items. This resulted in excessively large basic loads. MEDTC recommended that FANK equate basic loads to days of supply and then continue to use the French "Unit of Fire" system that the Khmer understood. Although it was recommended, little progress toward this end has been achieved.

Third Quarter CY 71 (First Quarter FY 72) was concerned mainly with obtaining enough funding to maintain a 30 day stockage objective in Cambodia through the use of routine barge and air shipments, also the FY 72 ammunition program was restructured to fit within the 200 million dollar program ceiling. This second objective was achieved after the Country Team approved the position to support only those weapons authorized under MAP for a 220,000 man force structure. This had the effect of reducing the ammunition dollar requirement from 187 million dollars to approximately 90 million dollars. It was agreed that FANK would continue to issue ammunition for all weapons on hand in Cambodia, therefore an ammunition supply rate (ASR) was imposed. This was put into effect 15 August 1971 and continues to be the policy. The policy has been adhered to except on occasions where Khmer tactical situation and internal distribution circumstances have caused variation from this policy. These occasions have been infrequent and in general adequate ammunition has been available to meet all contingencies.

During Third Quarter CY 71 development of a FANK required supply rate (RSR) was started with a projected 6 to 9 months to complete. Also alternate sources of supply were planned to replace USARV and 7TH AF to continue support of FANK/MEDTC munition requirements from RVN. This was due to the drawdown. MEDTC long and short term solutions were

provided to CINCPAC, which called for a contractor operated supply point in RVN as a short term solution; and direct shipments from CONUS to Kompong Som as the long term solution.

During the 4th Quarter CY 71, ammunition supplies requiring shipment started to exceed the transportation capability. In addition, VNAF support for from 4 to 6 sorties per day was withdrawn. 7th AF C-130's were allocated to MEDTC to fill this gap and MSC provided more barges and tugs for the Mekong convoy operation. During this quarter, the stockage objective in Cambodia was raised to 45 days in order to support the 20 separate storage locations in Cambodia.

Operation Chenla II required several airdrops of ammunition from ARVN because units were either surrounded or not able to draw from in-country supply points. Resupply of ammunition was adequate and the operation had no adverse effect on overall assets.

Weapons supply has, except for a few instances, maintained pace with unit activations. A few slippages were experienced but to date these slippages have not been catastrophic.

Where weapons are not available, it has been due to production or rebuild limitations which are known to those concerned and considered in MAP Cambodia plans.

f. Quartermaster/Medical

The Quartermaster area took on considerable extra importance due to the top priority given FANK battalions training in RVN who received the bulk of QM equipment.

Initially, excess TA-50 items (clothing and personal equipment) from U.S. Army Vietnam were used to fully outfit the FANK units. Gradually, the quality of the excesses being turned in and the inventory data describing it deteriorated until the source became unusable.

Due to higher priorities in Southeast Asia, there was a considerable delay in receiving CONUS TA 50 items as MEDTC turned to CONUS suppliers. After a considerable effort by MEDTC and higher Headquarters, the problem was resolved and the equipment is being received in meaningful quantities. No such critical problems are anticipated in the future.

Medical activity was, primarily; delivery of four 100 bed hospitals and a 400 bed hospital. Although funds were made available for medical supplies (drugs and

biologicals and medicines) the FANK medical service has not yet requisitioned adequate supplies. In fact, the extent of "requisitioning" activity during all of Chenla II was a verbal request for 500 first-aid compresses. MEDTC, in conjunction with MACV Surgeon, developed a medicine package based on estimated casualties, and used it as a repetitive "push package" shipment.

The source of supply was partially an ARVN loan and partially an issue from USARV Medical Command (MEDCOM). The latter organization is standing down and accepts our requisitions only on a "fill or kill" basis, so as to assist in drawing down their stocks prior to closure.

Since added medical requests are sure to follow insertion of hospitals, action has been taken to obtain access to U. S. Army Material Agency Pacific on Okinawa to fill emergency requests. The action has been approved and should assist the flow of supplies until normal inventory management procedures can be put into effect by FANK and requisitions placed on CONUS.

g. Engineer/Signal

In the engineer/signal commodity areas, efforts in supplying critical items, such as bulldozers, bridging material, and dry batteries, have been for the most part successful. Bulldozers have been obtained from rebuild in Korea and are due in from Navy project stocks. In bridging material, worldwide excesses were successfully exploited. Twenty-three railroad bridges were located in Thailand excesses and were supplied to FANK. These bridges should be extremely beneficial in re-establishing supply lines on interdicted highways. In addition, one excess bailey bridge was supplied to FANK. Screening activity by this office is continuing and should prove beneficial in supplying these desperately needed items.

Most of the efforts in the signal area went toward establishing various rebuild programs. In the case of EE-8 telephones and AN/PRC-10 radios, excess unserviceable ARVN assets were used as basic rebuild elements. If the unserviceable equipment was repairable, as it was in most cases, MEDTC saved the funds that would have been expended for the corresponding new equipment. All expenditures for these rebuilt radios were limited to the R&R cost. Another rebuild program was initiated for repair and return of modules for AN/PRC-25 radios. In this program, unserviceable modules are air shipped to Lexington Bluegrass Army Depot, where repairability determination is made. If the modules are repairable, MEDTC receives credit in the form of 35 percent of the replacement cost toward the purchase of the new

modules. This has proved to be a thrifty yet effective way to supply replacement parts for FANK communications gear. Another system by the engineer/signal commodity manager was forecasting future dry cell battery requirements. This system provides the six month lead time necessary for supplying FANK's demands in this area.

h. Ordnance

A significant effort in the ordnance area during CY 71 was to provide automotive equipment to Cambodia. A significant number of major items were supplied during the last two quarters of the year. One notable achievement during the Second Quarter was the outfitting of the FANK Cavalry Squadron with Armored Personnel Carriers and Mortar Carriers. In this action, USARV upgraded depot assets to Scram 1 condition and installed ancillary equipment (radios, armament subsystems, etc.) on the carriers. Because of this action, transportation time for the equipment from CONUS was eliminated, and the squadron was operational much sooner than expected.

A similar approach is being used for attrition replacement M113's. The vehicles are from assets in Vietnam; the armament and radios from CONUS. USARV will perform installation. Whether USARV will have the capability to perform the same action on the FY 73 squadrons is in doubt.

BII (jacks, tire wrenches) shortages for wheeled vehicles was a serious problem. Due to higher priorities the supply of certain of these items for MAP Cambodia was nonexistent for a time, though presently resolved. Pilferage of BII from vehicles in Saigon and enroute up the Mekong increased the severity of the problem. This pilferage has been overcome by shipping the BII, now arriving in large quantities, in welded CONEX containers instead of affixed to the vehicle. Intentional damage to hydraulic cables, air hoses, and other equipment has not been checked.

As another exception to rule, the urgency of need was deemed sufficient to supply Cambodia with end items before insertion of Concurrent Spare Parts. MEDTC has no technical supply section, so no regular means of providing item spares was available. For in-country requirements, letters in French were received, translated, and used by the end item manager to prepare MILSTRIP requisitions. Other requests for spares were received from the out-of-country training camps. Since neither USARV nor ARVN use some of FANK's weapons, the end item manager processed the requests as CONUS requisitions. Austere staffing caused problems since the repair part requests were invariably on a needed yesterday basis rather than to meet requisitioning objectives,

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so temporarily commodity managers were diverted from managing their commodities. The most successful repair part operation to date has been the establishment of a complete PLL for the Cavalry Squadron using TDY assistance.

Technical supply functions are to be absorbed by contractual action in Phnom Penh, with quantitative monitoring and fund control retained in MEDTC. Meanwhile concurrent spares are beginning to arrive in quantity and are through-put to Phnom Penh.

B. Continuing Projects

1. Training and Technical Competence of Assigned Personnel

The majority of personnel assigned to MEDTC (FWD) are required to be "qualified" in either French or Khmer. The result of this requirement has, of course, been that most personnel assigned to MEDTC (FWD) have some French background, none speak Khmer, however only a few are truly fluent in French. Experience has shown that, although the French language is important to American officers in Cambodia, technical competence and professionalism must be kept in balance with the language requirement. It is important to identify officers and NCO's for assignment to MEDTC who possess the requisite professional background as well as some knowledge of the French language. If there were a few personnel assigned to MEDTC who are fluent in French and who could act as interpreters and one or two who are fluent in Khmer, the remainder of personnel assigned could be identified as requiring only limited French or no language requirement at all, as is the case for most of the administrative personnel.

Notwithstanding the requirement for French language, the training and technical competence of personnel assigned to MEDTC continues to be of primary concern. In a short tour environment, personnel should not only be technically competent in their specialty areas but also have prior training or experience in MAP procedures. Two areas are critical -- programming and liaison. Personnel assigned to programming positions should have attended the Military Assistance Programmer/Advisor Course or had prior MAP programming experience. Some background in ADP is also helpful. In the liaison area key personnel should be members of the Military Assistance Officer Program (MAOP) who have had repetitive tours and specialized training in Southeast Asia. A well founded knowledge of the geography, traits and characteristics of the people and an understanding of the language are essential to establishing effective relations in a short time period under wartime conditions.

The effectiveness of US personnel stationed in Phnom Penh has been enhanced by assistance provided to MEDTC by the Khmer Republic. Military drivers have been assigned to the U.S. vehicles used by the MEDTC; guards are stationed at the various quarters/houses where MEDTC personnel live; MEDTC personnel are authorized, on a space available basis to use Khmer Air Force C-47 when traveling TDY from Phnom Penh to Saigon and return; and a building has been provided to house all US enlisted personnel in Phnom Penh.

2. Transportation Assets

Because of the relatively austere staffing of MEDTC and the demands incumbent in administering a \$200 million dollar program under wartime conditions, it is imperative that all administrative support be geared to optimize the effectiveness of assigned personnel. Delay inherent with inadequate transportation and communications squander manpower resources and hinder mission accomplishment. To rectify this situation a requirement for sixty-three vehicles was submitted to CINCPAC on 30 December 1971 as a part of the Joint Table of Allowance.

As of 1 January 1972 twenty-eight vehicles were on hand. An additional twenty-four vehicles are on requisition and are expected to be delivered on or before 30 June 1972. Additional vehicles will be requisitioned as funds become available.

These vehicles are required to provide responsive, dedicated transportation in the performance of required duties. Numerous visits and coordination with FANK, ARVN and MACV elements are required and must be performed without delay. In addition, these transportation assets are used to provide transportation for personnel between their place of duty and their quarters. In Phnom Penh individuals are billeted in leased housing in several areas of the city at varying distances from the place of duty.

It is neither feasible nor desirable to use vehicles with a greater passenger capacity particularly in Cambodia. Larger vehicles are very conspicuous in local traffic and larger groups of Americans become lucrative targets for terrorist attack. Further, the scattered locations of billets make consolidated bus runs impractical considering the congested traffic conditions and the need to avoid routine routes and schedules for security reasons.

In addition, vehicles are required to carry cargo to and from warehouses, airports and quarters. The U.S. Government is also required by contract to provide transportation for Air America personnel who provide technical advice to the Khmer Air Force.

3. Transshipment thru Vietnam

Three major problems have developed due to transshipment of supplies thru RVN:

- (a) Restricted availability of assets..

(b) High priority of shipments, and;

(c) Security.

The purpose of the Long Binh Storage Facility is to receive and temporarily store MAP Cambodia cargo until it is required in Cambodia. The contractor has limited storage facilities and transportation assets available for his use. Also 463L pallets, used for air shipments are in short supply throughout Vietnam. These facts combined with the high priority of this MAP program create a strain on the limited resources available to respond in a completely satisfactory manner to Cambodia's logistical requirements. The rapidly changing tactical situation in Cambodia combined with the immense material shortages created in the Cambodian Armed Forces by its rapid growth are understandable factors in the creation of high priority requirements. But the fact remains that a supply support system cannot effectively respond when all its requirements are high priority and none are routine.

Security of MAP cargo is a problem mainly at the Newport Army Terminal while in storage and on Tran Hung Dao convoys during transport. Pilferage on vehicles is a particular problem but general cargo received at Newport is also pilfered. As long as vehicles are received in shiploads of 150-200 and shipped out in barge loads of 25-30 vehicles then there will be vehicles stored in the port that will be subject to pilferage. In an effort to reduce or eliminate this pilferage the contractor has been directed to remove all batteries and BII boxes and place them in welded conexes for barge shipment. To improve security of our cargo under local haul all Vietnamese drivers have been replaced by Korean drivers. Also, when security cargo is hauled (weapons, medicines) a U.S. Military Police escort is obtained from USARV.

V. SECTION II - MEDTC RELATIONS WITH OTHER US AGENCIES

A. AREA OF PROGRESS

1. Relations of MEDTC(FWD) with ANEMB/SAS

MEDTC(FWD) functions as a full member of the Country Team in the American Embassy, Phnom Penh. CHMEDTC or his representative attends the daily Country Team meetings. Administratively, MEDTC has entered into a Shared Administrative Support (SAS) agreement with the embassy making available to MEDTC government leased housing with utilities and furniture, the embassy currency exchange cashier and the finance section, administrative support in the embassy, and participation in the in-country language program. SAS has resulted in closer ties between MEDTC and the rest of the embassy and not only has made our administrative burden lighter but also eliminated some duplication of effort.

2. Operation of CCMSA/Emergency Action Subcommittee

The Coordinating Committee for Military and Security Affairs (CCMSA) is a high level embassy committee consisting of Ambassador Swank, Mr. Enders (DCM), Mr. Ladd (Pol/Mil), General Matakis (CHMEDTC), Colonel Amos (DATT), and Mr. Stein (CAS). This committee meets weekly for the purpose of disseminating policy guidance from Washington and from the Ambassador to all members and to discuss military matters affecting the security of Cambodia. To handle requirements developed by combat, an Emergency Actions Subcommittee

CCMSA was established. This subcommittee has representatives of Pol/Mil, MEDTC, and DAO and is charged with the responsibility for processing emergency requests for assistance and material from FANK. The committee is the point of contact for FANK. During periods of high tactical activity, FANK holds a daily situation briefings. A member of MEDTC plus a member of the Emergency Actions Subcommittee attends those briefings.

3. Command Relations with MACV

The terms of Reference for MEDTC designates COMUSMACV as the coordinating authority to insure compatibility of U.S. military assistance to Cambodia with Vietnamization. Further, the TOR charges COMUSMACV to provide administrative and logistical support, to include airlift for the MEDT. Within these TOR, MEDTC operates closely dependent on MACV. MEDTC is neither configured nor staffed to operate independently. Daily coordination is maintained with staff elements of

MACV and in particular MEDTC relies on MACT, the J2, J3 and J4. MACT plans and supervises or coordinates all Cambodian Training conducted in RVN. The J2 and J3 maintain Cambodian desks and provide daily intelligence and operations summaries and friendly and enemy order of battle data. The J4 provides a full range of technical advice, transportation assistance and feed back on the local availability of supplies and equipment. As the situation requires, all staff elements have assisted MEDTC with expert advice and have studied and recommended solutions to numerous problems. MACV and its subordinate commands have provided individuals and teams to enter Cambodia to survey schools, training centers, and a host of other technical areas to provide data so that MEDTC can tailor its equipment and supply support to match Cambodian requirements. Examples of this type of support are too numerous to detail. To elaborate on just one area, the MACV Surgeon has maintained continuous liaison with MEDTC and the FANK Surgeon. Based on knowledge gained in this liaison, the MACV Surgeon has recommended to MEDTC the types and quantities of medical equipment for all FANK MAP supported Tables of Organization and Equipment, the numbers and types of hospitals to MAP support, and the types and quantities of medical drugs, biologicals and surgicals to program. Lastly, the MACV Surgeon has maintained and operated the MEDIVAC system in support of MEDTC in Phnom Penh.

In addition to the assistance received in mission performance, MEDTC is wholly dependent on MACV for administrative support. All aspects of administrative support such as maintenance of personnel and financial records, billeting, messing, APO, dispensary, in and out processing and intra and inter country transportation are provided by MACV.

4. Office of the Defense Attache

MEDTC and DAO coordinate closely on trips to the field. Under the current system and for the purpose of maximum utilization of the limited aircraft support available, MEDTC's end-item utilization inspection teams travel on the same aircraft with DAO personnel where possible.

There is a free exchange of information pertaining to the missions of the two elements. Since DAO travels to elements in contact to which MEDTC personnel do not go there are some instances of DAO reporting in their channels which, as raw information rather than evaluated intelligence has occasionally given false pictures of the logistics situation.

DAO has agreed to verify such information with MEDTC and keep MEDTC advised of conditions and quantity of material observed.

5. Tripartite Deputies

From its inception and first meeting on 15 January 1971, the avowed purpose of the Tripartite Deputies has been to foster and encourage cooperation between RVNAF and FANK. With General Weyand as the principal MACV representative, LTC Nguyen Van Manh representing RVNAF and BG Sak Sutsakhan representing FANK, the results to date have been quite favorable and encouraging. Although the second formal meeting was not held until 17 May 1971, subsequent events have led to regular monthly meetings and the establishment of a Tripartite Deputies Working Group to serve as the point of contact for all matters of interest to the Tripartite Deputies and to provide liaison between the Deputies and the MACV, RVNAF and FANK staffs. Outgrowths of the Tripartite Deputies Meetings have been a series of cooperative efforts between FANK and RVNAF to include combined operation of Mekong convoys, combined tactical operations joining RVNAF and FANK ground forces in securing lines of communication, RVNAF support of FANK with close air support, tactical helicopter troop lifts, aerial resupply missions, artillery fire support, the establishment of FANK liaison teams operating with RVNAF forces in Cambodia and a host of training (both individual and unit) mutually arranged between FANK and RVNAF.

Progress in this area was not without difficulty both because of traditional ethnic animosities and a misunderstanding of the purpose of the meetings. In early Working Group meetings, understandably enthusiastic staff officers recommended solutions to problems posed by the Deputies which required large expenditures of material, supplies and funds not consistent with U.S. objectives in Cambodia nor consistent with the MAP funding constraints. As a result of this and to keep the bilateral efforts within areas attainable with existing or programmed assets, a procedure was instituted to have a MEDTC representative attend all Working Group meetings, the CHMEDTC attend all Deputies meetings and all reports and minutes are forwarded through MEDTC for comments prior to implementation. Likewise where Tripartite Deputy recommendations require action by MEDTC (such as reprogramming, rescheduling activations, requisitioning supplies, etc.) a procedure has been established to provide a report of the action taken to the Deputies at their next meeting. The system of action taken is operating well and the U.S. participation appears to be functioning as a true "catalytic agent" toward the goal of gaining the cooperation of RVNAF and FANK in working together to defeat the common enemy.

6. Survey Teams

The mere delivery of equipment to Cambodia on a push basis using U.S. or RVN models is neither economical nor efficient. To maximize the effectiveness of the limited funds available in order to furnish items truly required by FANK, not duplicative of existing capabilities and yet not beyond the capability of FANK to receive and employ effectively, it has been necessary to conduct detailed reviews of material requirements in Cambodia. MEDTC has not been staffed with the depth or expertise to perform this function in all areas. As a result a series of Survey Teams have been dispatched to Cambodia to perform this function. The teams have been constituted in response to requests from the CHMEDTC, the Ambassador and in some cases CINCPAC. All surveys have responded to perceived problems or suspected problems either resulting from preliminary studies or based on extrapolation of like conditions encountered in RVN. In each case the Survey Teams have published recommendations which have been implemented by MEDTC when applicable and furnished to FANK as a guideline for their action.

a. Internal Security

After the softball field terrorist attack on members of the Embassy and MEDTC, the Ambassador requested assistance to upgrade the Embassy internal security and improve security of the domiciles. In response the security of Embassy personnel in Cambodia was reviewed. A Mobile Training Team (MTT) was brought to RVN to train the Prevote Militaire to perform the external security mission properly and additional weapons and equipment were provided under MAP.

b. Air Ground Operations

Evaluation of combat operations demonstrated that FANK was not utilizing their available air support to the fullest extent. A survey team evaluated air ground operations and recommended changes in the radio equipment to be furnished under MAP, additional out-of-country training, the establishment of an in-country school, and simplified air ground procedures. As a result of this survey and the added equipment, air ground operations have improved with KAF experiencing a higher sorties rate.

c. Port Security

Based on the desirability of utilizing Kompong Som to deliver MAP equipment and supplies and calling on experience gained in RVN, a port security survey has been formed

to evaluate Kompong Som. Again an MTT will train MNK personnel on the most effective way to employ MAP delivered craft and equipment to insure the unincumbered flow of MAP goods through the harbor.

d. POL

The POL survey, responding to concern about the adequacy of POL handling facilities, determined that the planned delivery of equipment under MAP were excess to requirements. The resulting programming changes deleted approximately \$360 thousand dollars worth of equipment from the MAP.

e. Staff Procedures

Evaluation of the Chenla II operation indicated that staff planning deficiencies contributed to the problems encountered during the operation. Since this operation lost substantial quantities of MAP furnished equipment, a survey team studied FANK Staff procedures to insure the effective use of MAP furnished equipment and supplies. The staff procedures survey has lead to the establishment of a Senior Staff Officer's Seminar to be held in RVN.

f. Logistics

A logistics survey of FANK was conducted by USARPAC logistics representatives during the period 1 May and 11 June 1971, to determine those facets of the existing logistics system that required improvement. In addition to observing supply procedures the team addressed requirements for out-of-country technical assistance, technical publications, and out-of-country rebuild. Recommendations were made to develop supply forms and procedures standard to all services, to establish logistics training programs in RVN, to eliminate obsolete and excess stockage, and to obtain current publications. A requirement for out-of-country rebuild was recognized for a period to last until in-country facilities could be developed. A key recommendation was to obtain Third country nationals to advise and assist the Cambodia logistics system for a period of one year.

g. Training Centers and Schools

All training centers and schools operated by FANK have been or are scheduled to be visited by a survey team. In all cases these survey teams have been made up of personnel who are very highly qualified and experienced in the type training being surveyed. These teams investigate the adequacy of the facilities available, the Program of Instruction,

the training aids, and instructor and cadre qualification. Their report to CIMEDTC becomes the basis for acquisition of materials and for the programming of training of personnel. Schools surveyed to date include Army Training Centers at Kambol, Kampong Speu, Sisophon (inactive), and Lovek (inactive); the Navy Training Base at Chruai Chang War; the Air Force Schools at Battambang and Pochentong; Signal School; Artillery School; Language Institute; OCS; Transportation School; MP School; Engineer School; Ordnance School; and Medical School (Jan 72).

h. Ammunition

An ammunition survey of FANK was conducted by MACV ammunition representatives during the period 5-23 June 1971 to evaluate storage facilities and determine their vulnerability to destruction. Storage facilities were found to be extremely poor. Stocks were subjected to adverse environmental conditions and were vulnerable to destruction. The survey team concluded that the FANK ammunition system was marginally capable of providing ammunition support and recommended upgrading inventory management and stock control procedures, construction of storage facilities, training of personnel, development of an alternate transport resupply system, and introduction of third country technicians in the FANK ammunition system.

i. Artillery

An artillery survey was conducted by USARV during the period 2-9 July 1971. As a result additional fire direction sets, barrier material, lubricants and cleaning material and technical manuals were provided to FANK; the ASR was reduced for 105mm ammunition and maintenance procedures were revised.

j. Maintenance

A maintenance survey of the GKR maintenance system was conducted by USARV maintenance representatives during the period 2-11 August 1971 to formulate recommendations to upgrade the system. General observations pertaining to all services were that tools were not being adequately distributed and effectively used, that maintenance facilities were not effectively used and required repair and rehabilitation, and that operator and maintenance training was required prior to fielding new equipment. Third country national maintenance assistance personnel were recommended to provide FANK technical advice on upgrading their maintenance system.

k. Medical Facilities

A survey of FANK medical facilities by MACV Command Surgeon representatives was conducted during 23-31 August 1971 to evaluate the facilities and the capability to receive field hospitals programmed for issue during FY 72. During the facilities survey, all equipment observed required preventive maintenance. A determination was made that FANK was able to receive the hospitals, but a survey of power, water, and sewage requirements had to be conducted prior to delivery.

1. Distribution

The FANK distribution system was surveyed by CINCPAC. The team identified problems and made recommendations in the areas of warehousing and transportation operations.

7. Loan of Equipment

Procedures for loan of equipment have developed as an outgrowth of a recommendation of a Tripartite Deputies Air Ground Working Group to provide MRC-108 radio sets for Tactical Air Control Parties. Assets were available from 7th AF resources but difficulty was encountered effecting a U.S. Air Force to Khmer Air Force loan agreement. Accordingly, CHMEDTC requested that a joint MACV/MEDTC committee be established to work out an agreement for effecting loan of equipment. The purpose was to expedite effecting loan of equipment to meet urgent requirements which develop in a wartime environment, and cannot be met by the peacetime geared MAP.

After several "strawmen", a joint Memorandum of Understanding was signed by CHMEDTC and MACV Chief of Staff. Essentially, it outlines coordination procedures and communication channels. It provides for MEDTC verifying the requirement as valid, reviewing the program to determine if expedited delivery or reprogramming is necessary, and notifying MACV Cofs of the urgent requirement. Then MACV, in coordination with designated staff agencies in the service components, determines the equipment availability and disposition instructions and provides MEDTC the data with MACV recommendation. MEDTC would then take appropriate action to effect the loan in accordance with procedures established by the respective MILDEPs.

8. Loan of UH-1H Helicopters

Coordination with USARV and the 34th General Support Group has resulted in the rapid loan of UH-1H helicopters to replace those undergoing extensive maintenance, combat battle

damage repair, and periodic preventative maintenance inspections. This arrangement has enabled the KAF to retain on hand their maximum authorized quantity in an operational ready status and obtain maximum utilization of aircraft.

In view of the drawdown of U.S. activities in RVN, this technique for providing operational UH-1H's in Cambodia may no longer be available. Emphasis will have to shift to maintaining available assets in an operational status. Plans are being developed for third country IRAN/CBD repair of the Cambodian helicopters. Likewise, the parts and supplies necessary for in-country support will be obtained from CONUS sources to insure supply pipelines are established as soon as possible since these have previously been obtained through USARV sources.

9. Tan Son Nhut Air Base - 7th Air Force

Relations with the USAF are excellent and have resulted in the supplying of critically needed supplies/equipment on an issue or loan basis. The assistance of the DCS, Logistics of 7th AF and the 7th AF AFLC Liaison Office was instrumental in obtaining a contract to provide improved radio communication on six Cambodian AC-47 aircraft. The coordination with 7th AF resulted in the establishment of this modification which will provide much needed AC-47 gunships to the KAF.

The establishment of Project Peace Chess to provide IRAN and repair of Combat Battle Damage for T-28 aircraft has filled an urgent need for support of these aircraft for maintenance levels that cannot be performed by the KAF. This support was arranged with a contractor in Thailand and administered by the Air Force Contract Maintenance Center (AFCMC) at Wright-Patterson AFB and its detachments at Bangkok and Udorn, Thailand.

B. Continuing Projects

1. MAP Procedures in Wartime

A major constraint of the execution of the Cambodian Military Assistance Program is the relative inflexibility of MAP procedures under wartime conditions. From the start the program has been forced to use artificial and unrealistic leadtimes. Normal MASL leadtimes do not provide the response necessary in wartime. This was not a severe constraint early in the program because adequate supplies were available in PACOM due to the drawdown of U.S. forces to satisfy Cambodian requirements without regard to normal leadtimes. As this

source disappears, longer and longer leadtimes to obtain equipment appear forthcoming. Since MAP Cambodia did not exist and has not been funded sufficiently to project and fund requirements one or two years in advance, this situation will continue at least one or two more years. Although all Departments have responded admirably in delivering equipment, only limited relief is foreseen through normal MAP procedures to provide requisite material on short notice.

Even when material is available off the shelf to meet urgent unprogrammed requirements, delays in requisitioning are incurred by the normal MAP approval and funding procedure. Although DOD and CINCPAC have made prodigious efforts to process Cambodian requirements, emergency approval, funding and particularly dissemination of funding authority routinely exceeds six weeks.

Under normal MAP procedures, operations are sustained by receipt of equipment and supplies planned for and funded in prior years. In Cambodia operations have been sustained by current year funds. Both the uncertainty of the total program and the incremental funding under continuing resolution authority have prevented orderly and timely funding and requisition of investment type items and operating supplies. Plans have had to be constantly modified to adjust for the receipt of funds. And requisitions have had to be submitted with high priority and short RDD's in order to satisfy urgent requirements.

Some provision should be made in MAP procedures to designate MAP countries at war and institute special procedures for their support. These procedures should include limited authority to requisition items not listed in the MASL, items not programmed and approved by DOD before the fact, and limited OSP authority. These are areas where some limited authority should be delegated to the local US representative so that he can respond rapidly to urgent military requirements and minor requirements with a significant psychological impact.

2. Status of Supply from ILC/NAVILCO/AFLC

Timely receipt of status on "dollar line" requisitions, both from the standpoint of quantitative data and financial data, is an area that must be improved. Coordination is being made with the supplying activities to insure the feedback information is provided in a timely and efficient manner. Status of supply action on "each" lines is also an area that is being pursued. Data flow must be improved to insure MEDTC is aware of the actions being taken to provide "each" items on a programmed basis.

Requisitions are submitted by message or AUTODIN. The use of AUTODIN is being increased since the quantity of traffic exceeds MEDTC's manual capacity. Telephonic liaison is maintained with key USAILC personnel both by MEDTC Army Logistics personnel and by the AMC Liaison officer who is in almost daily contact with MEDTC. Along with increased use of transcieved data, increased automation in MEDTC Army Logistics is required to generate follow on status requests and shipment tracer action. By mid-February the volume of requisitions will make use of transceiver communication and its associated automation of input a necessity.

VI. SECTION III - MEDTC RELATIONS WITH FANK

A. AREAS OF PROGRESS

1. Weekly Meetings With FANK

Beginning 2 July 1967, CHMEDTC and Asst. CHMEDTC have met weekly with FANK representatives to discuss problems and to exchange ideas. The meetings have become a focal point for coordinating efforts to MEDTC and FANK as well as for eliminating areas of misunderstanding. Through these meetings CHMEDTC has been able to discuss priorities with FANK if he feels efforts should be directed at a particular action which needs added emphasis to better meet the objectives of MAP. On 5 February 1972 the first meeting was held under a new concept to include POL/MIL and DATT representation. The agenda for these meetings will include FANK presentation of the current military situation as well as specific items proposed for discussion by FANK or U. S. representatives. This should provide for better exchange of ideas and promote better understanding and pursuit of common goals.

2. Daily Liaison

Daily liaison between MEDTC and FANK should be discussed in two categories. First, MEDTC Logistics and OR&L officers and NCO's deal with members of FANK daily. This is the main interaction between the two organizations which gets the day-to-day work accomplished. Second, during periods of high tactical activity, FANK holds daily situation briefings which are attended by MEDTC personnel acting as members of the AMEMB's Emergency Action subcommittee of the CCSMA.

3. MEDTC and MNK Monthly Conference

Commencing in July 1971, the Navy representatives from MEDTC and MNK senior officers have conducted monthly conferences at the Naval Headquarters in Phnom Penh. These meetings have provided a valuable exchange of data and a discussion and resolution of mutual or individual problems. All aspects of the MAP program have been discussed ranging from joint planning for the receipt of craft, weapons and other equipment, to scheduling of training for boat crews and maintenance, to the requirements for ammo and follow-on spares and the procedures for obtaining these supplies. After each meeting, minutes are published and actions are tasked to members of MEDTC with the results presented as the opening agenda item of the following meeting.

4. Khmer Air Force/MEDTC Air Force Conferences

In order to help overcome the problems created by a split operation, physical separation of MEDTC-FWD and KAF Headquarters, and poor communications facilities, it was decided to conduct periodic meetings between key KAF headquarters staff personnel and the USAF members of MEDTC.

The first such meeting was held in October 1971 at KAF Headquarters. The meeting focused on establishing procedures for joint planning, understanding MAP and constraints thereto, and determining the form future meetings should take. The second meeting was held at MEDTC Headquarters at Saigon while the KAF staff was on an orientation visit to 7th AF Headquarters. This meeting dealt with agenda items which had previously been identified and was in essence a working conference. The third meeting, held in Phnom Penh in January 1972, was intentionally pitched at a higher level. The purpose was to sit in "executive session", discuss problem areas, agree on courses of action, and establish projects and identify specific joint working groups to take required actions.

5. Training

When MEDTC was organized very little training was conducted in-country. Practically all training of Khmer Armed Forces was being conducted in RVN or Thailand. The schools system to support the pre-war military force had been staffed by a considerable number of French nationals. When this manager instructor group left in March 1970 the Cambodian military schools system, small as it was, became practically non-existent. In addition, many training areas soon became surrounded by the enemy. Station complements including trained cadre, were and still are employed as security elements thereby reducing their training potential.

The Office of the Director General of Instruction has been organized and although beset with organizational and growing pains is making efforts to expand in-country training. U.S. assistance has been primarily in the areas of assisting in coordination of transportation for out of country transportation for out of country training and encouragement. Initial U.S. representation in-country for training was one officer, this has now increased to seven. This permits increased assistance for planning and assistance to the Director General for Instruction. Training for the Khmer Armed Forces is now conducted both out of country and in-country as follows:

a. Out of Country Training: MAP supported training is now conducted in CONUS, Okinawa, RVN and Thailand. A limited number of students have been sent to the U.S. This includes English Language instructors training at Lackland AFB, two pilots attending squadron officers school at Lackland, and one student at USACGSC. Unit intelligence officers are being trained at the USARPACINTS at the rate of

30 per month. This will be expanded to include counter-intelligence, and collection officers. Training in RVN, by far the most significant, includes battalion training conducted by the Individual Training Group (ITG) (U.S.), and company training, specialist and cadre training including a brigade command/staff course conducted by the Vietnamese. This is by far the major training effort to sustain the Khmer Army. This training conducted in battalion and company training centers also includes training for air base security units and Khmer Naval Infantry. The 7AF conducts training for Forward Air Guides, MRC-108 operators and pilots and maintenance personnel for the U-1 and T-41. An OSI MTT conducted training for U.S. Embassy security elements. The Vietnamese Navy has assisted by training boat crews and specialists for the expanding Khmer Navy to provide for an early assumption of Mekong River escort operations. MAP supported training in Thailand includes both regional and special forces units.

b. In-country training: Slowly but surely progress has been made in some areas of in-country training. The old DGI was very slow and deliberate but did make gradual progress. The new DGI has grandiose plans based on an early MACV training survey which was unrealistic because of available resources. However some training is being conducted. MEDTC has, with the personnel in-country, initiated actions to survey all schools and develop a realistic training program and provide for a minimum amount of aid in the form of training aids and equipment and construction materials. Action has been taken to assign MAPEL line numbers for all schools and training centers to facilitate MAP support. Schools which have been surveyed, and some training aids orders, include the Artillery, Signal, Military Police, OCS, Air Force and Navy. Schools being surveyed include Psychological Warfare, Engineer, Transportation, Quartermaster and Ordnance. Some training has been conducted in all schools with the exception of POL where the FANK depends on the commercial POL distribution community for training although a few distribution personnel are being trained in RVN and some are to be trained in CONUS. A Language Lab and English language training facility were established in Phnom Penh in early November and another in Battambang in mid-November. These facilities will provide not only a training nucleus but assist in processing students for off-shore training both in CONUS and to assist non-MAP supported training conducted in Australia or other English speaking areas. Nine Cambodians have been trained in Vietnam to conduct Vietnamese Language instruction in Cambodia in line with encouragement of tripartite activities; however, formal training has not started. The brigade commander/staff training conducted in RVN is to be transferred to Cambodia and originally to

commence in January will probably resume in February. This will be reinforced by a senior staff officer course to be conducted in RVN by a MACV team for selected FANK senior staff officers. Company training is being conducted in Kampong Speu and Kambol, plans have been developed to expand Kampong Speu into a six battalion training center. Plans to establish an individual training center, a capability which is sorely needed to replenish serious losses in mobile reserve battalions, have not materialized. Currently, replacements are trained by military regions or in units. Extensive training to upgrade NCO and specialist skills and to train non-MAP supported cadre is accomplished at Kambol, Battambang (Air Force), and at Chruai Chang War Base (Navy). However all training is inhibited by lack of training aids, qualified instructors and housing. Most importantly, training is being conducted even if it is marginal.

6. Language Institute

The Language Institute in Phnom Penh has been operating since November 1971 with a capacity of 240 students. There are 24 classrooms each with a capacity of 10 students. The current enrollment is 76. The staff consists of 14 officers plus 3 Philippino instructors; the latter are paid by MAP. Of the 14 officers, 8 are now at Lackland AFB, 5 studying Language Instruction Management and 3 studying English Language Instruction. Four more will go to the United States during January 1972. At Battambang there is a small language lab which was established under the prior MAP program. The lab has a capacity of 40 students and has been supplemented with instructional material borrowed from South Vietnam. Ten additional lab positions were requested for the FY 73 MAP Program to increase the school capacity.

7. Training Center Development

The emphasis in the field of training is to develop a training base in Cambodia in order to eliminate the requirement of sending large numbers of units and individuals to RVN and Thailand for training. The training centers have progressed as outlined below.

Training Center #1 at Kambol was conducting individual training. The center has been selected to be the company training center. The capacity is to be twenty companies with five companies arriving every four weeks. To expand, 66 additional acres adjacent to the center have been procured. Authority to purchase materials to construct 20 buildings to be used as classrooms and barracks, and materials for 4 administrative buildings has been requested. Electrical

[REDACTED]

distribution system materials, water distribution system materials, training aids, and range materials have been requested through MAP. The POI to train companies has been developed and the training center has conducted one training cycle with five companies. One hundred ninety-four company training center cadre, who will be assigned to Kambol, completed training in Vietnam during December 1971. Expansion to 20 company capacity cannot be completed until after the construction materials arrive.

Training Center #3 at Kampong Speu has been selected to be the Bn Training Center and it will have a capacity of six battalions. The POI for battalion training was given to the FANK Liaison Officer at Long Hai, Vietnam by the ITG and translated into Khmer by the Liaison personnel. The training center, which measured 5Km X 4 Km, has been expanded to 5 Km X 11 Km and is large enough to train six battalions simultaneously, including the firing of all TO&E weapons. Material has been requested for twelve additional barracks/classroom buildings. Also requested were materials for electrical distribution system, training aids and range materials. Training center cadre will begin training in Vietnam during January 1972.

No decision has been made regarding the location for a national individual training center. Several Brigades conduct basic training for their own units.

8. Schools Development

As each of the schools is surveyed, actions are being taken to acquire the necessary training aids, facilities, or instructor training. Schools still to be established in Cambodia are the Intelligence School, Command and Staff Course, and Special Warfare School. The chart below shows the status of schools which are conducting training as of 31 January 1972.

IN-COUNTRY SCHOOLS

ARMY

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TYPE TNG</u>	<u>TRAINED AS OF 31JAN72</u>	<u>IN TNG</u>	<u>SURVEY</u>
	<u>Signal</u>			
Ang Snoul	Radio Oper	119	195	Yes

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TYPE TNG</u>	<u>TRAINED AS OF 31JAN72</u>	<u>IN TNG</u>	<u>SURVEY</u>
Chan Chou	<u>Engineer</u>			
	Mine/Demo	371	0	Yes
	NCO	21	66	
	Basic Off	14	0	
Lovek	<u>Ordnance</u>			
	Basic Off	84		Yes
	Enlist	146	162	
Phnom Penh	<u>Quartermaster</u>			
	NCO	196	0	5-10 Feb
Pochentong	<u>Transportation</u>			
	Drivers	629	261	Yes
Phnom Penh	<u>Artillery</u>			
	Basic Off	20	0	Yes
	NCO	31	17	
	EM Basic	379	0	
Phnom Penh	<u>Military Police</u>			
	Off	152	17	Yes
	NCO	912	0	
	EM Basic	271	230	
Phnom Penh	<u>Medical</u>			
	Aidmen	166	0	Yes
	Basic EM	129	141	
KG Kantauk	<u>Ordnance</u>			
	Weapons Repr	24	0	Yes

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TYPE TNG</u>	<u>TRAINED AS OF 31JAN72</u>	<u>IN TNG</u>	<u>SURVEY</u>
KG Chhnang	<u>Off Candidate</u>	284	233	Yes
Sre Khlong	<u>Armored Recon</u>			
	EM Basic	179	150	No
Phnom Penh	<u>PSYWAR</u>			
	Off	56	0	Yes
Phnom Penh	<u>Language</u>	5	75	Yes
<u>AIR FORCE</u>				
Battambang	Pre-Flight		0	Yes
	Flying	60	17	
	Cadet Non-Fly	0	94	
	NCO	130		
	Specialist	576	200	
	EM Basic	198	0	
	Security Bn	206	0	
<u>NAVY</u>				
Chrui Chang War	Off	128	72	Yes
	EM Spec	196	465	
	Boat Crews	39	9	

9: End Item Inspections

A major effort is directed to end-item inspection of equipment by the liaison branch to fulfill statutory responsibilities in determining status of MAP supplied material and training within FANK MAP supported units. End item inspections are conducted for all FANK sea, air and land elements equipped and supported by MAP. This MAP support applies to not only current MAP equipped units but also those MAP equipped elements from the previous MAP. Current policies provide for inspections of those units already supported at least annually and for preinspections of those units/elements to receive major items of equipment such as aircraft or navy craft. Transportation for inspection of units other than those located in or in the near vicinity of Phnom Penh must be by aircraft. This transportation is provided by U.S. Aircraft from RVN with the exception of a small amount provided by the Khmer Air Force. Transportation is at a premium and every effort is made to consolidate trips with DAO personnel and to use available Khmer transportation. Results of these inspections have contributed significantly to the analysis of FANK unit capabilities and more recently to isolate major personnel and equipment losses suffered by committed MAP supported units. Results of these inspections are used to verify FANK reports of combat losses suffered during operations. These inspections also serve to isolate weaknesses with the FANK force structure and provide a basis for recommendations for change in TO&E's or need to develop or improve certain functional areas. For example, the lack of an intelligence capability has led to the development of an intelligence unit TOE and plans for establishment of an intelligence school. Inspection teams are normally accompanied by at least one G-4 representative.

The most significant accomplishment of end-item inspections is to provide feed back to MEDTC on the actual situation in the field. This feed back, although admittedly just a sampling, is the primary source of data on which management decisions must be based. In this regard, it is mandatory to continue staffing MEDTC to conduct end item inspections to insure proper use of US furnished equipment and determine whether continued US expenditures are required or merited.

Continued effort is required to insure that inspections are conducted of all MAP support elements. The continued commitment to combat of certain units will remain a problem of availability for inspection. There will continue to be units or activities where FANK authorities may not want inspectors to probe too deeply due to inadequate personnel

accounting procedures, low morale or other reasons. In spite of this it will be necessary to pursue an aggressive inspection program. FANK can be expected to continue to employ units without replacement of personnel or equipment until units become ineffective. Results of these inspections can be expected to continue as the basis from which to work with FANK on efforts to improve personnel, training, and logistics procedures. This inspection procedure provides the only valid basis for the analysis of conditions within the operational elements.

10. Phnom Penh Port Improvements

Because of the insecurity and intermittent interdiction of Route 4, Phnom Penh continues to be the primary port of entry for MAP goods delivered to Cambodia. From the earliest deliveries to the present, the only piers and cargo handling capability have been located in the heart of Phnom Penh. Hazardous cargo, particularly ammunition, has been unloaded, comingled with other cargo and moved by truck through Phnom Penh to the storage sites. This is an extremely hazardous situation and poses a threat to residential and business areas, to the existing piers and to nearby bridges. As a result an urgent requirement existed to establish a pier facility for the off-loading of hazardous cargo at a site away from the heart of the city of Phnom Penh. Plans were developed to upgrade an existing railroad pier at the 6 Km mark of the Tonle Sap River. Contracts for the upgrading projects were programmed and funded through MAP and the required material handling equipment will be procured through AID funds per agreement between State and DOD. The facility will be available for use approximately 20 February 1972. This will provide an overall increase in cargo handling and throughput capacity as well as dispersion of hazardous cargo. In addition, the civil pier facilities in Phnom Penh are being upgraded to increase cargo throughput. Upon completion of the contract work on these facilities and receipt of required material handling equipment, the capability will exist more than adequately to handle projected MAP and commercial tonnage through the port of Phnom Penh.

11. Airbase Security

The vulnerability of the Khmer Air Force air bases was a known fact even prior to the sapper attack on Pochentong in January 1971. Efforts were underway to rectify the problems when the attack accentuated the vulnerability and need for expedited action.

MEDTC coordinated with MACV/7th AF to obtain the services of USAF Red Horse personnel in RVN. A Red Horse team surveyed Pochentong, Ream, and Battambang and drew up plans for each. The plans showed layout of outer and inner perimeter barriers, gun posts, towers, lighting system, ramp expansion and revetments. The required parts and materials were also identified.

Expedited action was taken on procurement of the security material for Pochentong and the installation progressed steadily. All that remains for complete security installation at Pochentong is hook-up of the installed lighting system and the construction of additional revetments. The outer and inner perimeter fences have been completed at Ream and Battambang, some revetments have been constructed, and parts and material to complete the installation of these bases and Kompong Cham have been programmed and requisitioned. Thirty-two revetment kits were obtained from excess USAF assets in RVN.

And finally the training of units to man the defenses is progressing apace. One Mobile Operation Battalion trained and equipped in RVN has been transferred to the KAF and assigned to defend Pochentong. One additional battalion is being equipped and trained in GKR to expand the Pochentong perimeter. Additional units are scheduled to deploy to Ream and Battambang to relieve regional and general reserve units for their primary missions.

12. Improvement in identifying supply requirements, requisitioning, receiving, warehousing.

Suggested supply procedures for improvement of the logistical system were presented to FANK. The procedures were accepted by FANK and are now in the implementation stage. First requisitions under this system were submitted from MEDTC, Phnom Penh to MEDTC, Saigon on 16 December 1971. Procedures are still being translated into Khmer and it will be the end of February 1972 before any real result will be seen at the unit level. With the setting up of the Foreign Assistance Office (FAO), the material receipt procedures have improved because of the centralized control for the receipt and initial issue of the materials. Both the Air Force and Navy have completed an inventory of repair parts; established stock record cards, converted part-numbered items to Federal Stock Numbers and implemented inventory control systems to interface with the respective U.S. Supply system.

13. Combat Loss Reporting Procedures

In efforts to plan and program for the replacements of material and equipment lost during combat operations, FANK initiated in September 1971 a Combat Loss Reporting System which met all U.S. requirements. The FANK G-4 realizes that accurate and timely reporting will allow the expeditious refitting and reconstituting of units. However, initial implementation has been slow and of questionable accuracy. Actions are underway to improve the accuracy and the timeliness of these reports.

14. In-country Log Base

Efforts have been expended to extend and improve the logistical bases. The ammunition base depot at Kantauk has been constructed for both covered and open storage and accommodates a 5000 short ton capacity. FANK has successfully established a more effective ammunition handling and distribution capability with its organic transportation facilities. The FANK POL base depot at Prek Phnau requires upgrading and sufficient excess materials to do so have been located in CONUS. The QM depot now has developed a capability to manufacture 12,600 combat rations per day. Plants are now cooking and dehydrating rice, beef, pork, and packaging the dehydrated foods for issue to troops on combat operations. Prefabricated structures and replacement for destroyed warehouses in the depots, logistical complexes in military regions and for newly established training centers continue to be received.

The entire spectrum of maintenance in-country needs improvement to eliminate the split assignments for maintenance and to train the individual in maintenance of his equipment. Planning is now underway to set up Preventive Maintenance Courses for commanders and to institute a series of maintenance bulletins in the FANK Army Publications in order to aid in this program. The MNK has instituted a diesel inspection program on craft by the senior MNK Engineer Chief Petty Officer to include the issuance of PMS manuals (in French/Khmer) for each craft to effect the program.

To provide an in-country KAF logistics system, capable of supplying and maintaining the Khmer aircraft, a contract was established to provide a Logistics Management Assistance Team (LMAT) to assist and train KAF personnel in supply and maintenance procedures. This team has established the basis of a simple, manual accounting, supply system with the KAF personnel now doing a large part of the requisitioning,

receiving, storing, and issuing of supplies and equipment. The progress of the KAF in maintenance of aircraft has also been good and has reached the point where all organizational maintenance is being performed in-country for the O-1D, U-1A, C-47, UH-1H, T-28, T-41 aircraft except for UH-1H preventative maintenance periodic (PMP) inspections which still are performed for the most part by USARV. Only those combat battle damaged aircraft and those requiring IRAN are being maintained through third-country sources and by contract.

To insure more responsive supply action on returning aircraft non-operational ready due to supply (NORS) to an operational ready status, all NORS requisitions are provided MEDTC Saigon by telephone. Sources in RVN (Tan Son Nhut Air Base, AMMC, etc) are screened for availability and if assets are located, priority shipment is effected. All other requirements are placed on CONUS source of supply by priority message. These actions have resulted in more expeditious supply action and more accurate NORS records and greater visibility of outstanding NORS items.

SECTION III

B. Continuing Projects

1. Middle Management

There is a lack of middle management throughout the military forces in Cambodia, both as a lack of middle management capability and as an attitude. Middle management concepts are simply not part of the Cambodian way of doing business; authority for all decisions is retained at the top.

To rectify this situation requires both training and experience in management and command and control techniques. Several training programs have been instituted to alleviate this problem. A Senior Staff Officers Seminar has been started in RVN. One officer is now at USACGSC at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Officers have attended the Battalion and Brigade Commanders Course in Vietnam. Battalion cadre precede their battalions when going to unit training in Vietnam for a three week course conducted prior to the arrival of the troops. As a result of this type of training some progress has been seen regarding delegation of authority. This improvement can be expected to continue, and even accelerate, as this type of training continues. The vast majority of the officers below the high ranking national level are relatively untrained and inexperienced. They are officers because of their civilian education. With training and experience for officers at the Senior Staff, Brigade and Battalion levels this situation should improve.

2. Joint Planning with Khmers

The MAP Plan is classified and its contents cannot be released in toto to GKR. They are of course aware of the scope of the program and also know what units and activities are to be MAP supported. At some point in time plans, programs and scheduled equipment deliveries must be declassified so that FANK can plan for the receipt of equipment. Personnel in MEDTC must insure that neither equipment deliveries nor any other aspects of the MAP plan are revealed to GKR until it is certain that the program will be approved and funded. Still FANK needs to be informed of programmed deliveries in time to plan for receipt of the equipment and for training of personnel. They must receive information in time to accomplish both, although they do not need to be informed of quantities of specific items programmed for following fiscal years. CHMEDTC, Chief Logistics Division, and Chief, OR&L

Division must determine when to inform FANK of future deliveries. If new units or crews must be formed and trained, then advanced notification is required. The present procedures for funding and short leadtimes have prohibited furnishing adequate information to FANK for them to respond adequately with their own plans.

3. Personnel.

There is an urgent need for FANK to develop an administrative system which, at a minimum, can perform:

- (1) Recruiting and or induction of service qualified personnel.
- (2) Screening of personnel for various potential skill levels by past experience and tests.
- (3) Personnel records maintenance for centralized control and reassignment procedures.
- (4) Effective discharge and elimination procedures for unfit personnel and personnel with expired terms of service.
- (5) Review and control of local currency utilization provided through MAP.

Through the medium of scheduled meetings between the FANK General Staff and MEDTC, FANK has been made aware of MEDTC's interest in proper personnel management and of the effective utilization of manpower resources. MEDTC's primary interest is in the maintenance of integrity and strength of MAP trained and supported elements, the proper utilization of MAP trained specialists, and the use of MAP furnished equipment. In addition, MEDTC is charged with review and observation, but not audit, of utilization of PL 480 generated local currencies for the portion of the military budget covering military pay and allowances (MPA). Subsequently, MEDTC has a basic interest in personnel management but cannot influence it other than by offering appropriate training in various levels of management, recognizing that top and middle management will not become effective in the foreseeable future and that personnel management for FANK cannot be based on present U.S. doctrine and procedures. Based on this estimate MEDTC took the following actions:

- (1) Requested and obtained a survey team from MACV to study the FANK personnel system. This study was superficial and directed toward recommendations for improvement on the basis of simplicity and low cost to achieve a

reliable personnel records system including specialist identification, unit strengths, and other pertinent procedures. The study was completed 14 October 1971 and was passed to the DCSPER, FANK. FANK has not completely reacted to the recommendations, but there have been indications that a critical shortage of administrators may preclude implementation of the better part of the recommendations within the remainder of FY 72.

(2) Prevailed on FANK to obtain authority for the establishment of a recruit receiving station and a replacement training center.

(3) Influenced FANK to establish holding units for hospitalized and other personnel to remove them from combat unit rolls, and thus permit input of replacements.

In continuing discussions with responsible FANK personnel management officers it is evident that the High Command recognizes the need for effective management and progress is being made. For instance, a unit census directed by Marshal Lon Nol is proceeding and has identified accurate unit strengths in many FANK battalions. In other areas, FANK is proceeding with personnel identification to include ID Cards, and is working on the standardization and simplification of personnel records, the promotion system, and the elimination of unsuitable personnel. Despite this progress MEDTC believes that FANK must resolve their near-term and long-range management problems more expeditiously and need an additional in-depth study to provide them with specific recommendations. On 27 January 1972, MEDTC requested that CINCPAC provide a survey team for this purpose.

4. Monitoring FANK Pay Using CIP Expenditures

During the month of August 1971, representatives of MEDTC and USAID Cambodia met to discuss the Country Team position for the release of Local Currencies generated by Public Law 480 sales and the Commercial Import Program to the Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR). Since the Country Team was going to propose to the GKR that the United States Government (USG) partially support Forces Armee Nationale Khmer (FANK) Military Pay and Allowance (MPA), it was determined that MEDTC did not possess necessary personnel to develop required procedures to properly discharge its tasks of review, observation, and inspection of the GKR National Defense Budget as it applied to MPA. As a result of this determination, the Ambassador was notified on 25 August that MEDTC was not staffed to accomplish this mission and that CINCPAC assistance was being requested.

A study of MPA was conducted by a CINCPAC Survey Team and it was determined, that because of in-country personnel limitations placed on MEDTC, a full and detailed review and observation program implementing local currency utilization could not be conducted by MEDTC. Based on the extremely limited staffing capability of MEDTC-FWD and the Ambassador's guidance to be austere, the Survey Team proposed to accomplish the review and observation mission with one officer employed full-time within the borders of the Khmer Republic. The Survey Team further emphasized that this one officer could only provide a minimum of assurance, on a management by exception basis, that local currencies released to the GKR were properly utilized in the implementation of the MPA portion of the Defense Budget.

MEDTC recommended an addition of one space to the MEDTC-FWD JTD, raising the total number of spaces to 51. This has been concurred in by the Ambassador, and a qualified officer has been assigned.

On 13 October 1971, the USG and the GKR signed Project Agreement (PRO AG) No. 442-11-080-001 providing for local currency contributions in support of FANK MAP. The PRO AG specified that the GKR would submit to MEDTC not later than 12 November 1971, financial reports reflecting personnel strengths and funds disbursed during the period 1 January thru 31 August 1971. Monthly reports updating the initial data are to be submitted on a periodic basis. However, since MEDTC had not yet received the initial group of financial reports as of 17 December 1971, it was recommended to the Country Team that future release of local currencies to the GKR be suspended pending receipt of the reports.